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1 RELATED WORKS
1 Related Works
Any device connected to the global Internet network is continuously exposed
to various types of threats. Very frequently, viruses, worms and malicious attacks
jeopardise home as well as business devices [1]. However, appliances in non-Internet
based networks are endangered as well. For instance, sensor networks, which are
located in premises of a specific company and which are not connected to the Internet,
can become a target of several damaging network attacks, where DoS is the most
malicious type of attack. The comprehensive taxonomy of possible cyber-attacks is
discussed in [2].
Due to these threats, an active approach to security is very important in
the terms of data encryption, key distribution complex systems, authentication,
authorisation, and accounting. A typical broadcast authentication communication
within information systems is characterised by plain text communication between
nodes, which do not mutually authenticate. Consequently, this represents the
possibility where an attacker can theoretically reach the whole group of receivers
with a malicious intention. To provide the respective access control key distribution,
transmissions sources authentication, and streams non-repudiation, broadcast
authentication protocols were designed. Even though there is a slight difference
in the terms broadcast and multicast definition, the common attribute is that there
always exist a group of receivers, no matter the amount of group members is equal
to all or only a few members of the network. From the technical perspective, the
communication is one-to-many or many-to-many [3].
Although the key management schemes are designed to exchange keys within
group members to protect the traffic from different types of network attacks, they are
not ready to cope with malicious network threats as the denial of service (DoS) type
attacks. In [4], the authors analysed sensor network layers (as per ISO/OSI model)
and possible DoS defences and confirmed that the limited resources of nodes make
digital-signature schemes impractical and authentication poses serious difficulties.
Broadcast authentication is an essential service in distributed sensor networks.
Because of the large number of sensor nodes and the broadcast nature of wireless
communication, it is usually desirable for the base stations to broadcast commands
and data to the sensor nodes. The authenticity of such commands and data is critical
for the normal operation of sensor networks. Due to the resource constraints on sensor
nodes and possible node compromises, broadcast authentication in wireless sensor
networks is by no means a trivial problem [5].
In an unicast environment, the data authentication can be achieved using an
elementary mechanism, where the transmitter and the message recipient share
a secret (symmetric) key to compute a message authentication code (MAC). This
cryptographic primitive assures the recipient that the transmitter generated the
received message. Unfortunately, the common symmetric authentication method does
not work in broadcast environment, because every recipient of the given message
can impersonate the sender and forge the message, as the MAC key of the source
transmitter is known to these nodes. Therefore, an asymmetric algorithm based on
digital signatures is necessary for such purpose [6]. Thus, there exist two methods
how to authenticate a broadcast transmission in sensor networks. The first way is to
utilise a modified symmetric cryptographic algorithm and the second way is to apply
an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm.
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In broadcast networks, it is necessary to authenticate a single transmitter to more
than one receiver [7]. The first possible solution is a hop-by-hop authentication of
every message. Unfortunately, once a huge amount of messages approaches a specific
node (e.g., a DoS attack situation), the authentication of every packet brings a huge
delay from the end-to-end perspective [8]. None of the currently applied broadcast
security protocols in sensor networks does effectively deal with DoS type attacks and
does not minimise the end-to-end delay to prevent the overall energy depletion. Since
this research work provides enhanced framework based on DREAM approach.
The DoS type of incident in the broadcasting communication can be prevented by
verifying each packet’s origin in the network. However, this method can influence
and increase the time that the packets spent in the network and result into an almost
impossible communication. This issue can be resolved by using the DoS resistant
efficient authentication mechanism (DREAM) [9].
Besides DoS, the DDoS attack represents a more malicious threat. The DREAM
mitigates the DDoS impact by involving analogous approach, where more stations
are involved in the verification process. The DREAM can operate in two modes:
normal and secure. In the secure mode, every incoming message is authenticated by
the network node before being sent to the outgoing interface, whereas in the normal
mode, some of the messages are sent directly to the outgoing interface without being
authenticated. This approach mitigates a potential single point of failure in the whole
network since there is not a single dedicated node where the authentication occurs,
but distributed among the neighbours. The protocol functionality is influenced by the
following parameters [10]:
• HT – number of nodes that message passed without authentication. For
such each node, the parameter is incremented by one. When the packet is
authenticated, HT is set to zero.
• NBR – number of neighbours.
• K – maximum number of nodes, that can message pass without
authentication.
• b – expected number of neighbours in unity distance from the source.
• c – expected number of neighbours in unity distance from the last node
that forwards the message.
The amount of messages to be sent or verified before sending out the interface is
defined by the following decision rules (formulae):
Rand >
b
NBR
, (1.1)
Rand >
2 · c
NBR
, (1.2)
where Rand is a random number generated by every node for every message
in the range of 0 and 1 with the uniform distribution. The node decides to
authenticate/forward the message according to the (1.1) formula result, when the
packet comes directly from a neighbour, the neighbour has been verified, or the
parameter HT = 0. The node decides to authenticate/forward the message as per
the (1.2) formula, in case the message did not come from a direct neighbour, the
neighbour has not been verified, or the parameter HT > 0.
The emphasis on minimal energy consumption is common as well as the security
and DoS resistance for both designs, the sensor networks as well as for femtocells [11,
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12, 13]. The femtocell is a wireless network located indoors sharing the licensed
wireless spectrum with the macrocell and is connected through a backhaul link, based
on the well known Internet protocol (IP), to the mobile operator core network. Unlike
the optimised deployment of macrocell base stations, the femtocell access points
are very low-power and small base stations designed for the use in small spaces
such as residential end-user households or small business environments without any
supervision of the macrocell [14].
Compared to cellular systems, wireless local area networks (WLANs) had the
primary purpose as an local area network (LAN) extension for those users, who cannot
use the fixed wired connection. The 2G, 3G, and 4G cellular systems operate with
a dedicated backbone and its network is usually separated from the Internet. The
system as a whole is independent and fully functional without the global network.
Nevertheless, the demand for IP services from mobile users caused mobile operators
to extend their services and interconnect the mobile network with the Internet. These
services enabled a new approach to reach uncovered indoor spaces with mobile signal
by femtocells [15, 16, 17].
To ensure the availability and appropriate delay for sensitive traffic (packets
carrying voice, signalling, real-time streaming voice/video data, etc.), the IP backhaul
should assure quality of service (QoS) and provide appropriate security methods.
That means the backhaul connection should provide enough capacity and parameters
to avoid affecting the quality of voice call or carried data [18] and efficiently secure the
communication as well.
The security aspects of FAP communication were part of the FREEDOM
project [19]. Even though, several security models have been recently proposed,
the security is currently a critical and unsolved challenge of cloud technology which
requires to be standardised. The emerging technology enables to deliver computing as
a service, commonly known as the cloud computing. The current femtocells provide
only an interface between the mobile operator network and user mobile device via
the IP-based network (Internet). Therefore, the femtocell technology provides a new
environment for brand new mobile services development [20, 21].
Assuming the physical devices, network topology, and software are hidden from
the user’s perspective. Such deployment introduces a network cloud in the femtocell
environment. As discussed in the previous paragraph, this is a brand new approach
and does not have its generally accepted technical term. To distinguish the current
femtocell from the above described approach, it is designated as the next generation
femtocell (NGF) in this work 1.
The next generation femtocell deployment example, which is considered as the
new future mobile technology is depicted in Fig. 1-1. The FAPs are commonly
connected to the mobile operator network via secured tunnels to the femto security
gateway (FSG). However, the FAPs are interconnected and enabled to communicate
among them as well (direct FAP-to-FAP connectivity). The FAPs do have connectivity
to respective resources (data storages, database servers, and other servers) based on
the service offered by the mobile operator [23].
From the previous discussion can be seen that the sensor and future mobile
environments address the same security, energy consumption, and parameter
1 The authors in [22] use the NGF term in a more general way as they consider it as the future techology
but they do not discuss any specific options nor the cloud feature at all.
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Figure 1-1: The Next Generation Femtocell Deployment
requirements. Therefore, this thesis introduces a possible DREAM-based method how
to deal with security (mainly DoS resistance), minimise end-to-end delay of valid
messages, and save computing time (decrease energy consumption) by optimising
the architecture of the DREAM.
2 Aim of the Dissertation Thesis
Mobile technology develops very fast as well as data services provided via mobile
data networks. As the network devices can also be a target of a wide range of network
security threats, the appropriate security methods are necessary to be implemented
for protection. The most malicious is the denial of service attack, which can overload
the appliances and prevent the mission-critical data from delivery. In the broadcast
environment, which can be represented by future (next-generation) femtocell and
cloud technology, the delivery becomes a significant challenge.
Since the broadcast authentication protocols and femtocell security belong to the
areas of the author’s interest, this dissertation thesis introduces a new scheme based
on DoS Resistant Efficient Authentication Mechanism [9] with end-to-end delay and
energy enhancements and applicable in future mobile (femtocell) environment [24,
3]. Despite the DREAM was originally designed to minimise end-to-end delay in
broadcast networks, several parameters will be further examined and optimised based
on the specific network conditions.
Based on the former research accomplished in the previously mentioned topics,
the following goals of the dissertation thesis were determined:
• Design a new low latency DoS resistant mechanism for message
authentication (IDARED) based on the DREAM scheme.
• The modification consists of:
– involve split verification queue,
– provide appropriate parameters selection,
– reduce the total number of parameters of the mechanism.
• The new protocol should provide lower end-to-end delay compared to the
DREAM mechanism.
• The proposed mechanism will be examined theoretically and simulated in
MATLAB ® environment.
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To evaluate the DREAM behaviour, it was necessary to prepare an appropriate
environment for simulations. Usually, the basic stochastic parameters, which are
essential to correspondingly describe the examined scheme, are obtained from real
network simulations. Despite the fact that the financial and space resources were
limited, a basic simulation environment was developed to gather specific parameters
of the DREAM behaviour to simulate the new protocol enhancements instead of the
real world simulation.
As the main target of the research is to evaluate the DREAM behaviour, minimise
the delay caused by the mechanism itself, and to be able to compare it with the
newly proposed scheme, it was necessary to examine the stochastic distribution of
its parameters. Therefore, the following assumptions were considered:
a) For simplicity, the links between each two nodes of the network are equal
length, delay, and priority (cost).
b) As a consequence of a), a message can travel only one hop each round of
the program.
c) The energy sources and computing power of nodes are constrained
(wireless sensor network nodes and mobile femtocell access points are
considered). Thus, all steps are treated to minimise energy requirements.
d) The public key signature verification is a relatively time consuming
process (usually, in hundreds of milliseconds or seconds and depending
on the overhead of lower layer protocols) and the power source of
each node is limited (see c)). The duration of the previously described
verification process was set as the referential value and denoted as a unit
time delay (UTD). The UTD characterises the mean service time of the
message verification process of each node.
e) For simplicity, parallel processing of tasks in the verification queue is not
considered. Only a single message is processed at a moment as the spare
CPU resources are served for other tasks.
In other words, since the UTD is platform dependent, the following definition
clarifies that:
UTD = 1
or (3.1)
UTD = 100 [%]
represents the time required by the DREAM internal mechanism to process the
verification procedure for a single message. Using the described approach, the
research simulations provide hardware independent results, which are applicable
for any platform of a specific device (network node) [25]. The original parameters,
however, depend on the topology. The influence is caused by the average number of
neighbouring nodes and its statistical dispersion.
The program (script) developed within this research has the following features. It
simulates message broadcast propagation over a specified network [26]. The network
structure can be determined manually by the user or generated randomly according
to the Erdo˝s-Rényi model [27], the Barabási-Albert model [28], the grid topology, and
the N-ary tree structure.
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The result of the previously described procedure is a square and symmetric matrix
(the graph is undirected since messages can flow both directions) and having zeros
on the main diagonal (no loops are allowed in the graph, because a node will not
broadcast a message to itself). The simulation considers only non-weighted edges
having the weight equal to one. The approach of saving details of every message may
not seem to be system memory effective. However, it enables to track and evaluate all
the sent/dropped messages after the simulation and the influence of the mechanism
parameters and the stochastic distribution.
To be able to compare the results of simulations, a topology of specific parameters
needs to be defined. The network topology, selected by the authors in [9] and [5],
was set as a grid structure (Scenario 1) composed of 400 nodes, where 20 nodes were
equally spaced in the grid in each row and column 2.
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Figure 3-1: Average Number of Neighbours in WxW Grid Topology
Assuming the Scenario 1, increasing the width W of the grid network to infinity
(the total number of nodes N = W 2), the average number of neighbouring nodes
E[NBR] will converge to 4, since the number of nodes having three neighbours (nodes
on the edges of the topology) and two neighbours (nodes in the four corners) is
negligible compared to the total number of nodes Fig. 3-1. As per formula (3.2), the
rest of the nodes will have number of neighbours equal to four. As per formula (3.3),
the dispersion D[NBR] converges to zero.
E[NBR] = lim
W→∞
E[NBR(W )] = lim
W→∞
(
− 4
W
+ 4
)
→ 4, (3.2)
D[NBR] = lim
W→∞
D[NBR(W )]→ 0, (3.3)
whereW = {1, 2, 3, ...} (3.4)
To describe the DREAM using the respective mathematical model, it was necessary
to examine the distribution of the HT parameter based on the K parameter setup.
2 Assuming, the network graphG = (V,E) is composed of a set of vertexes (nodes) V = v1, v2, . . . , vN ,
where N = 1, 2, 3, ... is the number of nodes in G, and set of links (edges) E = {eij}, where eij =
{vi, vj} denotes an edge between vertex vi and vj , then two connected nodes are called adjacent and
the degree k of a given node is the number of edges connecting it with other nodes (k = deg(v)), the
mean of k over V is known as the mean degree < k >. As technically, the mean degree represents
an average number of neighbours of the specific node E[NBR], the terminology will use the E[NBR]
notation in this thesis [29].
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The purpose of the K parameter is to limit the spread of unauthenticated messages
through the network. In networks, where the D[NBR(W )] << E[NBR] (here
E[NBR] = 3.8 and D[NBR] = 0.18045), the distribution of HT in the network is
naturally limited by a specific value of the K parameter, and its increasing values
do not affect the distribution of HT . To preserve the equal chance a message can be
authenticated before been sent and a message can be sent without prior authentication,
the b and c parameters were set up to enable a 50% probability a message will
be forwarded without prior verification and a 50% probability a message will be
authenticated prior forwarding (see formulae (3.5) and (3.6)).
0 < b < NBR ⇒ b = NBR
2
(3.5)
0 < c < NBR/2 ⇒ c = NBR
4
(3.6)
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Figure 3-2: Influence of K On HT Distribution (Scenario 1)
The simulation of Scenario 1, where the transmitter was randomly chosen (uniform
distribution) sending a single message throughout the network each iteration 3, was
iterated 106 times and provided the following results:
• If K = 0, all messages are forced to be authenticated (hop-by-hop), i.e.,
100% of messages has HT set to zero.
• If K = 1 or K = 2, the number of messages forced to be authenticated
decreases approximately to 60%.
• If K ≥ 3, the number of messages forced to be authenticated stabilises at
50%.
• Moreover, number of messages having HT > 5 was approximately under
one percent. Therefore, choosing K > 5 does not affect the results, as the
probability of appearance of such message is approximately 1%.
The simulation confirmed that, in a network composed of 400 nodes arranged as
per Scenario 1, fifty percent of messages is being forced to be authenticated and fifty
percent of messages is forwarded without prior verification, if K ≥ 3 (see Fig. 3-2).
Moreover, it does not have any effect to set K > 5 as the number of messages having
HT > 5 is under one percent (see Fig. 3-3).
3 A single iteration consists of broadcasting a message from a single node to all nodes in the network.
Once the message is processed by the last node a new iteration is triggered.
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To examine the discussed parameters in a random topology, the simulation was
accomplished for the selected random networks to compare them with the second
scenario tested by the authors in [9] and [5], which was a random topology of
400 nodes. Unfortunately, the authors did not clarify the details and brought some
confusion into the results of the accomplished experiment. Especially for the random
network, the average number of nodes and dispersion of the average number of nodes
were not provided, as it was significant and affects the mean end-to-end results and
distribution of HT values in messages (the behaviour of the mechanism). All doubts
and email reply from one of the authors is summarised in Appendix in the Doctoral
Thesis fulltext. As the random topology details could not be obtained to design exactly
the same scenario, only the Scenario 1 topology was taken into account for comparison
with the new proposed authentication scheme.
The previously described simulations provided different distribution results of the
HT values. Therefore, it was necessary to utilise some network topology oriented
parameters to provide an appropriate mathematical model of the DREAM node (if
such model exists) and to demonstrate the comparison results with the new proposed
scheme, since the DREAM behaviour is strictly dependent on the network topology
and its parameters.
D(G) = Di = D1, D2, ..., DN ; where D1 ≥ D2 ≥ · · · ≥ DN (3.7)
The authors in [30] introduced a specific approach how to measure homogeneity or
heterogeneity of a given network. The method is based on the entropy of a degree
sequence EDS examination. Assuming a graph G(V,E) (see footnote2on page 6), N is
the number of nodes, and D(G) is the vector of degrees of nodes (see formula (3.7)).
The EDS as a new measure of the heterogeneity of complex networks and
NEDS represents a normalised entropy of degree sequence NEDS . The EDS can be
calculated as per equation (3.8).
EDS =
−
N∑
i=1
Di lnDi
N∑
i=1
Di
+ ln
N∑
i=1
Di (3.8)
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As the NEDS is defined as per equation (3.9), the results are normalised to [0, 1]
interval 4.
NEDS =
EDSmax − EDS
EDSmax − EDSmin (3.9)
The two random graphs were generated (according to scale-free – BA model
and random ER model). A specific topology called N-ary tree, which represents
a regular tree topology, where each node contains N child-nodes, was simulated
as it is a scheme utilised for multicast networks [31]. The grid, as per Scenario 1,
was examined as well, and a bus, star and full mesh topology were generated for
reference. All simulated networks consisted of 400 nodes 5. The results confirmed
that the normalised entropy of degree sequence NEDS corresponds to the variance of
degrees of nodes D[Deg ] 6 (see Fig. 3-4).
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Figure 3-4: Results of Heterogeneity of the Selected Networks
The degree distribution of random networks were generated using the
Barabási–Albert and Erdo˝s–Rényi models. As discussed, the N-ary tree topology
is used in broadcast networks. Thus, the degree distribution of such scheme was
examined. Because the number of end nodes, forming the base of the hypothetical
"network pyramid", is relatively large (due to the number of child nodes and length of
the network), the group of single neighbour nodes dominates the degree distribution.
For comparison purpose, the regular lattice 7 network (as per Scenario 1) confirmed
that over 80% of nodes do have four neighbours and none has a single neighbour.
4 Since the Di > 0 and Di is an integer, the minimum value of EDSmin = (ln 4(N − 1))/2. The
maximum value of EDS corresponds to the most homogeneous (regular) network, and the minimum
to the most heterogeneous (star) network [30].
5 Only the N-ary tree consists of 341 nodes, as it is not possible to create an exactly 400 nodes network.
The N-ary topology is based on 4 children nodes of each node and network length (depth) equal to
four. It was compared with the respective 341-nodes full mesh network.
6 Technically, the degree of a node represents the number of its neighbours.
7 Regular or lattice network represent the same topology as the grid network.
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As stated earlier, the random topology details are not specified in [9]. Therefore,
to compare the results of the DREAM and the new proposed authentication scheme,
only the Scenario 1 topology results was taken into account.
To approximate the DREAM using a mathematical model, it was necessary to
define appropriate stochastic parameters. As these parameters of input data traffic and
service times were not determined by the authors in [9], the input flow characteristics
and the service time of the model were estimated as exponential. The exponential
character was chosen with respect to the known formulae to calculate sojourn times,
which enabled to express the measure of efficiency. The model is depicted in Fig. 3-5.
DREAM
Generate:
from:
+=
Authentication
Forwarding
E[S     ]
E[S      ] auth
 fwd
λn
λm
λn
λ λm Mean DelayE[S]
λ  auth λ  fwd&λ
λ  auth
λ  fwd
E[SD] = f(b,c,K)
Figure 3-5: Mathematical Model of DREAM
Let the normal user data arrival rate is denoted as λn and the malicious user data
arrival rate as λm. The two types of arrival rates produce the total arrival intensity λ,
which is offered to the DREAM block, see formula (3.10).
λ = λn + λm (3.10)
Based on the DREAM process, two different rates of customers are produced.
The arrival rate of messages, determined to be authenticated prior forwarding, is
denoted as λauth and rate of messages, which were determined to be forwarded prior
authentication, is denoted as λfwd .
Parameter λn λm µD µauth µfwd
Value 0.5 1.0 10 2 10
Table 3-1: Derived DREAM Model Parameters
To be able to compare the results of both models, the previously discussed
parameters were derived from [9] and are introduced in Tab. 3-1. The distribution
of arrival rates and the service times were estimated as exponential, thus the M|M|1
model was utilised. As a result, the whole system consists of two series systems, the
DREAM block and a system of a parallel block combination. Assuming the estimated
exponential distribution of arrival rates and the service times [32, 33] the mean sojourn
time of the whole complex model E[S] can be expressed as per the formula (3.11).
E[S] = E[SD] + E[Sfj ] =
1
µD − λD +
12− λauth + λfwd
µauth + µfwd
8
·
λauth + λfwd
µauth + µfwd
1− λauth + λfwd
µauth + µfwd
. (3.11)
The simulation results, the usage conditions, the optimisation details of the
mathematical model, which is the new protocol based on, and the selected results
are introduced in the next section.
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4 Selected Results
This section deals with selected results of the accomplished simulations. Based
on these results, the usage conditions of the proposed model are discussed.
The optimisation details and the new proposed latency efficient DoS resistant
authentication mechanism IDARED are introduced. As the power efficiency of newly
designed solutions is an important feature of contemporary solutions, the efficiency of
energy sources utilisation estimation is outlined. However, the specific optimisation
measure was not provided in this case and the limitations were clarified accordingly.
Both schemes, the DREAM and the IDARED are confronted with respect to the
end-to-end delay and security perspective.
Based on the probability decision (formulae (1.1) and (1.2)), the DREAM produces
two flows of messages – the first flow of messages to be authenticated and the second
flow to be forwarded prior sending out the outgoing interface. The probability
a message will be authenticated prior forwarding Pauth can be obtained, when the
number of authenticated messages is divided by the total amount of messages.
Analogically, the Pfwd can be obtained. Thus, the validity of formula (4.1) is apparent.
Pauth = 1− Pfwd (4.1)
Reference data, to compare the proposed model results, were obtained from [9].
The arrival and service rates were estimated as exponential, and the mean sojourn
time expressed as per formula (3.11). Although, the λ offered to the network node is
known (see equation (3.10)), the DREAM produces two flows of messages. Messages
to be delivered to the authentication queue λauth and messages to be forwarded λfwd
(see Fig. 3-5). Basically, this process depends on parameters b, c, and K.
Pfwd = p1 · p2 · . . . · pNHR = pNHR, where p1 = p2 = . . . = pNHR = p. (4.2)
Assuming, that the forwarding probability p is the same in each hop (from the
transmitter to the last node to receive the message) and the number of hops in a row
is NHR, the probability Pfwd a message will be forwarded after passing NHR hops can
be determined as per formula (4.2).
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Figure 4-1: Message Authentication Probability
Although the existence of an unauthenticated message can be limited by the K
parameter, the probability a message can travel several hops in a row without being
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verified is mainly determined by the C (and B) 8 parameter, as the applicable range of
values of the K parameter is strictly limited by the B and C parameters. For instance,
it is not beneficial to set the K > 5 (if C = 0.5) as the probability, a message will travel
five or more hops, is below one percent (the bigger the K, the nearer to zero), and this
is negligible from both, the security and the end to end delay perspective. Assuming,
the K parameter represents the number of hops in a row a message can travel without
authentication (K = NHR), the respective limit values of the K parameter can be
calculated analogically (see results for selected values of C Fig. 4-1).
For a comparison purpose, the simulations were accomplished again for the
specific case, where b = c. The results confirmed that the examined probabilities are
mainly influenced by the b and c parameters and the influence of theK parameter was
negligible (see Fig. 4-2).
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Figure 4-2: Influence of the K Parameter on Message Authentication Probability
The negligible influence of K parameter in Scenario 1 topology was also
experimentally proved and clarified as per Fig. 3-2 and Fig. 3-3. The results represent
a specific case where C = 0.5 (the normalised c parameter). Therefore, the K
parameter will not be considered in the mathematical model.
The authors of the DREAM proposed b and c parameters to control the random
mechanism behaviour. Once a message is received directly from a neighbouring node,
the DREAM uses the b parameter. The c parameter is used in the rest of the nodes to
affect the authenticate-first to forward-first ratio. Let the frequency of nodes, in which
the b parameter is chosen (direct neighbours of the original transmitter), is denoted as
fb. The frequency of nodes, in which the c parameter is chosen, is denoted as fc, and
the BCratio is defined as per formula (4.3).
BCratio =
fb
fc
(4.3)
The simulation was iterated 106 times and the following assumptions were
considered. Four different networks (Scenario 1, random BA and ER models, and
N-ary tree) were composed of 400 nodes 5, where each iteration produced a single
message broadcasted from a randomly generated node (uniform distribution), and
provided the following results. The BCratio is under one percent in random BA, grid
8 These are the normalised b and c parameters which are discussed further. See formulae (4.5) and (4.6).
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(Scenario 1), and N-ary network. And it is under two percent in random network
generated using ER model (see Tab. 4-1).
106 iterations Grid ER BA N-ary
E[BCratio] [-] 0.0096 0.0016 0.005 0.006
D[BCratio] [-] 0.0001 0.0005 0.001 0.003
Table 4-1: Comparison of BCratio in Selected Networks
The probability a message will be authenticated (and forwarded) can be estimated,
as the relative frequency of utilisation of both parameters, which were examined in
the relatively high amount of iterations. To be able to express the Pauth dependence
on b and c parameters, the relative frequencies fb and fc were taken into account.
Assuming the relatively high amount of iterations, the relative frequencies were
considered as equal to the respective probabilities pb → fb and pc → fc of influence of
the specific parameter. This behaviour was addressed by the application of a weighted
arithmetic mean as per equation (4.4)
Pauth =
pb ·B + pc · C
pb + pc
, (4.4)
where B and C are normalised b and c parameters as per equations (4.5) and (4.6).
The maximum values are apparent from formulae (3.5) and (3.6), and likewise, it is
obvious, that b is used to increase the authentication probability in the "one hop node"
distance from the transmitter, and such probability is twice higher than for c.
B = 1− b
bmax
= 1− b
NBR
(4.5)
C = 1− c
cmax
= 1− 2 · c
NBR
(4.6)
The course of Pauth was examined as a function of both the b parameter and the
c parameter. However, as per the original paper [9], the results were highlighted for
a special case, where b = c, for further comparison.
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Figure 4-3: Influence of Parameters on Authentication Probability
Generally, the geometric character of the Pauth dependence is a plane, as the b
and c parameters represent the corresponding limit, which is compared with the
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pseudorandom number. To address the utilisation factors of both parameters in real
networks, the weighted arithmetic mean was applied at first. Since the previous
step is independent on the network topology (assuming the 400 nodes topology),
several approximation tests were accomplished to minimise the difference between
the theoretical and real physical network topology (Scenario 1). The result is Pauth
corresponding to the grid network represented by formula (4.7) and exponential
dependency (see Fig. 4-3).
Pauth = EDS · (Pauth)NBR, (4.7)
where EDS is the entropy of degree sequence and NBR is the mean number of
neighbours (both related to Scenario 1). The complete Pauth is as per (4.8).
Pauth = EDS ·
pb ·
(
1− b
NBR
)
+ pc ·
(
1− 2 · c
NBR
)
pb + pc

NBR
(4.8)
The proposed model behaviour (the course of E[S]) was studied under normal
conditions (λ = λn;λm = 0) as well as in case a network device is being flooded
by a huge amount of messages (under attack, λ = λn + λm). The simulated results
were compared with the reference results published in [9]. The specific values of λ
parameters were presented earlier in Tab. 3-1. The difference between the proposed
model and the reference values increases with the decreasing value of the c parameter.
The difference is above 2% for c < 0.4 and for approximately c > 0.4, the difference is
below 2%, which was considered as an acceptable tolerance (see Fig. 4-4).
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Figure 4-4: Comparison of Sojourn Times Between the Reference and Simulated Results
Further simulations confirmed that the influence of the b parameter is minimal
and can be completely omitted in the new protocol approach. The formula (4.4) was
accordingly modified, thus only the c parameter was normalised. The difference is in
a range of milliseconds, which is negligible, compared to the authentication process
in a range of seconds (see Fig. 4-5).
Despite the original DREAM is designed to utilise both parameters, the results
presented in Tab. 4-1 and Fig. 4-5 showed that in 400-nodes networks the b parameter
influence is negligible regardless of the topology. The same results were obtained
when large networks, where the total number of nodes in the network N → 104, were
examined (see Tab. 4-2).
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c=b, c only [-]
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Figure 4-5: Comparison of Sojourn Times Between the Standard and Optimised Simulated
Results
The decrease is caused by the fact that the b parameter is only utilised in
neighbours of the original transmitter. BecauseN is significantly greater than E[NBR],
E[Deg ] respectively. Analogous simulations, accomplished for networks where N <
100, demonstrated that the E[BCratio] > 0.05.
106 iterations Grid ER BA N-ary
E[BCratio] [-] 0.041e-02 0.076e-02 0.019e-02 0.020e-02
D[BCratio] [-] 3.065e-09 2.283e-08 4.634e-08 2.010e-08
Table 4-2: Comparison of BCratio in Large Networks
However, the application of femtocells is considered to contain hundreds or
thousands of access points (as the analogy of the base transceiver stations (BTS) known
from the GSM networks). Therefore, the new scheme, named IDARED (which is
derived from DREAM), is designed to utilise the c parameter only.
It will be demostrated further that the sojourn time of messages delayed by the
authentication mechanism can be improved by the utilisation of a two-queue fork-join
system, when examined from the end-to-end delay perspective. The DREAM defends
a network node from DoS attacks as per the following mechanism. In the secure mode,
all of the incoming messages are sent to the verification queue where been verified.
However, assuming the normal mode, based on the probability (equations (1.1)
and (1.2)), a node decides whether to send the message to the verification queue or
forward the message to its neighbouring nodes directly (to randomly decrease the
end-to-end delay).
Either way, the message is sent to the verification queue since it needs to be
authenticated. As this queue is manipulated as per first in, first out (FIFO) queuing
way, the verification queue does not recognise, which messages were forwarded
before being sent to the verification queue or which were sent directly to the
verification queue. The red-labelled messages (ID2 a ID3) were forwarded prior being
sent to the verification queue. The yellow-labelled message (ID1) was determined to
be authenticated first (see Fig. 4-6). The split verification queue design (see Fig. 4-7)
has considered the creation of a new low-priority queue. Such queue is dedicated to
the verification of all messages which were sent without prior authentication.
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Figure 4-6: Current Mechanism of the
Verification Queue
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Figure 4-7: Split Verification Queue
Mechanism
Considering the split mechanism, the former authentication queue was
transformed to a high priority verification queue, as it is determined to authenticate
all messages which are marked as "to be authenticated" prior forwarding and the new
proposed scheme (outlined in Fig. 4-8) is now influenced by the c parameter only.
DREAM
Generate:
from:
+=
Authentication
Forwarding
E[S     ] fwd
λn
λm
λn
λ λm Mean DelayE[S]
λ  auth λ  fwd&λ
λ  auth
λ  fwd
E[SD] = f(c)
E[S       ]auth1High priority:
Low priority: E[S       ]auth2
Figure 4-8: Design of the New Proposed Mechanism
Using the same proposed model updated as per Fig. 4-8 and assuming the c >
0.4 (see the proposed model limits Fig. 4-4 for details), the split verification queue
approach provides significant improvement in the range of tens of percent.
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Figure 4-9: Results of the IDARED Compared to DREAM
Along with the increasing probability a message will be forwarded Pfwd (the
increasing c parameter), the effectiveness of the proposed solution decreases. This
is caused by the fact that λauth1 (the flow of messages targeting the high priority
authentication queue) rapidly decreases. As the probability a message will be
forwarded and authenticated is equal for c = 0.9 (assuming the Scenario 1 topology),
the E[S] effectiveness is approximately 25 − 30% (based on λ). Compared to the
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DREAM results, the effectiveness of the proposed solution increases if the total flow
of messages λ increases (see Fig. 4-9).
The IDARED is a new authentication mechanism to deal with denial-of-service
type of attack in broadcast networks. Compared to the DREAM, which it is derived
from, it also addresses the stochastic based decision of forwarding messages without
prior authentication but it is designed with special emphasis on minimising the
average end-to-end delay. Hand in hand with reduction of the internal processes,
the energy consumption efficiency increases.
Algorithm 4.1 : Verification and Forwarding Algorithm of IDARED
input: An overheard broadcast message m
1: if (overheard messages with the same (m.IDsrc , m.seqno) before)
2: then return;
3: end if
4: if (m.ID fwder is unknown neighbour)
5: then return;
6: end if
7: prob =
2 · c
‖Nbr(m.ID fwder )‖ ;
8: if (Rand > prob) then
9: // authenticate m first;
10: place m into high priority verification queue;
11: else
12: // forward m first;
13: rebroadcast m;
14: place m into low priority verification queue;
15: end if
The internal mechanism of the IDARED is described in Algorithm 4.1. It is
apparent that by utilising the c parameter only, the internal processes are reduced
compared to the DREAM. From the power point of view, fewer computations cut
down the power dissipation [34] and these requirements were addressed by the
IDARED. In order to compare the specific internal procedures, a model of the IDARED
is described in Fig. 4-10.
Compared to the DREAM, the difference is mainly in application of the split
verification queue concept, where the original verification queue is divided into two
queues of different priorities. Those messages which were forwarded without prior
verification are sent to a low priority queue and the rest of the messages reaches a high
priority queue. From the end-to-end perspective, the average delay for messages is
decreased since those messages, which were already forwarded without verification,
do not bring an extra delay to the messages in the high priority verification queue. The
sojourn time increases for messages in low priority queue. However, this introduces
an acceptable drawback of the proposed design since either way, all messages are
verified before these are processed by the given network device, only in a different
order than these arrived.
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Figure 4-10: Model of the IDARED Mechanism
5 Conclusion
The presented study in this dissertation thesis focused on the design of a new
low latency denial of service resistant mechanism for message authentication in
a broadcast network. As several papers related to broadcast authentication were
already published in the security area of wireless sensor networks, the results and
methods were utilised in the future mobile networks approach as well.
The new IDARED is derived from the DREAM scheme which means, the
mechanism decides, based on a stochastic condition, whether to authenticate
a message prior forwarding or whether to forward it without prior verification.
The main advantage of the IDARED over the DREAM, is in application of the split
verification queue concept. This approach enables to decrease the mean sojourn time
a message spends in the network device and thus, decrease the overall end-to-end
delay. The results of the accomplished simulations confirmed, that the mean sojourn
time decreased by approximately 25 − 30% for the IDARED, based on the input
message flow and assuming the equal probability a message will be authenticated
or forwarded without prior verification.
Another benefit of the IDARED is the lower number of used parameters and the
smaller protocol data unit. Although, the exact power consumption of the proposed
solution is strictly dependent on the utilized hardware of the femtocell device, it
was deduced that the power consumption of the IDARED will be lower than for
the DREAM. From the above mentioned results it is clear that the designed IDARED
scheme can be utilised as a DoS resistant mechanism and can help the mission-critical
data delivery in case the network or a part of the network becomes a target of
a denial of service attack in the future mobile networks (denoted as the next generation
femtocell or the femtocell cloud).
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SUMMARY ANOTACE
Summary
A typical broadcast authentication communication within information distribution
systems is characterised by plain text communication between nodes, which do not mutually
authenticate. To provide the respective access control key distribution, transmissions sources
authentication, and streams non-repudiation, specific authentication protocols were designed.
Although, the authentication of every incoming message seems to be a very effective way to
mitigate a denial of service type attack, such process results into an increase of end-to-end
delay. To mitigate this drawback, the broadcast authentication protocols have been proposed.
This dissertation thesis introduces a new IDARED mechanism, which is based on
a DREAM authentication scheme. IDARED provides lower latency results for end-to-end
data traffic, which was achieved by several parameters optimisation and a split verification
queue concept. The results are examined theoretically and using simulations in
MATLAB ® environment as well.
Keywords: authentication, broadcast security, DoS, DREAM, IDARED, latency,
mechanism, next generation femtocell, protocol
Anotace
Typická autentizace všesmeˇrové komunikace v distribuovaných informacˇních systémech
se vyznacˇuje komunikací v otevrˇené formeˇ mezi jednotlivými uzly, které se navzájem
neautentizují. Aby byla zajišteˇna odpovídající distribuce prˇístupových klícˇu˚, vzájemná
autentizace vysílacˇu˚ a dorucˇení datových zpráv, byly navrženy specifické autentizacˇní
protokoly. Acˇkoliv se autentizace každé, do uzlu prˇicházející, zprávy jeví jako úcˇinné rˇešení
pro potlacˇení útoku˚ typu zamezení/odmítnutí služby (denial of service), takovýto zpu˚sob
zvyšuje celkové zpoždeˇní prˇenosu zprávy mezi koncovými prvky síteˇ (end-to-end delay). Pro
potlacˇení této nevýhody byly navrženy všesmeˇrové autentizacˇní protokoly.
Tato dizertacˇní práce prˇedstavuje nový mechanismus IDARED založený na autentizacˇním
schématu DREAM. IDARED umožnˇuje nižší zpoždeˇní pro datový prˇenos mezi koncovými
uzly síteˇ pomocí optimalizace neˇkterých parametru˚ a konceptu rozdeˇlené oveˇrˇující fronty.
Výsledky jsou oveˇrˇeny teoreticky a rovneˇž v prostrˇedí MATLAB ® pomocí prˇíslušných
simulací.
Klícˇová slova: autentizace, DoS, DREAM, femtobunˇky nové generace, IDARED,
mechanismus, protokol, všesmeˇrová bezpecˇnost, zpoždeˇní
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